Stochastic Stability and Equilibrium Selection in Games.
consists of five papers, presented as separate chapters within three
parts: Industrial Organization, Evolutionary Game Theory and Game Theory.
The common basis of these parts is research in the field of game theory
and more specifically, equilibrium selection in different frameworks.
part, Industrial Organization, consists of one paper co-authored
with Prajit Dutta and Jörgen Weibull. Forward-looking consumers are
analysed in a Bertrand framework. It is assumed that if firms can
anticipate a price war and act accordingly, so can consumers.
part, Evolutionary Game Theory, contains three chapters.
All models in these papers are based on Young’s (1993, 1998) approach.
In Chapter 2, the Saez Marti and Weibull’s (1999) model is generalized
from the Nash Demand Game to generic two-player games. In Chapter 3,
co-authored with Jens Josephson, a special set of stochastically stable
states is introduced, minimal construction, which is the long-run
prediction under imitation behavior in normal form games. In Chapter 4,
best reply and imitation rules are considered on extensive form games
with perfect information.
The last part,
Game Theory, answers the following question: how players must
distribute their endowments during elimination cup tournaments, such as
in tennis tournaments.
Publication no 571, Price SEK 300:- + moms (VAT)